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CRITERIA FOR A THEORY ABOUT LAW*
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JURISPRUDENCE AS THEORY ABOUT LAW
In many areas of inquiry about social process today scholars are en-
gaged in creating comprehensive and well-articulated frames of refer-
ence-"general orientations" or "conceptual maps"-designed to guide
and assist in the conduct of studies.' Different scholars in different
areas seek of course to serve many different intellectual functions or
purposes through this creation of new and more effective theory, but
in a burgeoning literature, certain broad purposes appear with high
frequency:
the identification of the scholar or observer in relation to the
events being observed, with specification of his standpoint and
purposes;
the delineation of relevant foci for inquiry, with location of the
particular events being subjected to inquiry in the larger context
of events with which they interact;
the specification of a range of intellectual tasks pertinent to in-
quiry about any aspect of social process, including: clarification
of goals, description of trends, analysis of conditions, projection of
future developments, and invention and evaluation of alternatives;
the development of dependable and economic procedures for per-
forming the intellectual tasks regarded as relevant; and
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1. For a convenient review of relevant developments see 0. YOUNG, SMSrEMS OF PO-
imCAL SCINCE (1968); 0. YOUNG, A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
(1968); E. MymL.N, TuE THEORY AND METHOD OF POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1965); and W.
MAcGK E, POLITICS AND SOCIAL ScENcE (1967).
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the postulation and explicit disclosure of the comprehensive goal
values assumed in, or sought to be served by, inquiry.2
It will be observed that the purpose thus sought in these newer frames
of reference are more expansive than those either of traditional scien-
tific investigation, in the sense of search for highly generalized explan-
atory principles,3 or of traditional philosophic inquiry, in the sense of
derivational exercises in the syntactic dimension or other less specified
domains.4 What is aspired to in the new frames of reference is the
development of theory, both sufficiently comprehensive and sufficiently
detailed and articulated at all necessary levels of abstraction, to aid-
in ways that are dependable, appropriately selective, creative and
economic-in the performance of all the pertinent tasks of inquiry
about social process.
It is an unhappy fact that in the long history of systematic reflec-
tion and writing about law, stretching back at least to the beginning of
cities, scholars have seldom sought to construct theory of comparable
reach.5 Most of the great traditional, recurring emphases in theory,
sometimes characterized as "schools of jurisprudence," which continue
to have important effects upon both inquiry and decision, have been
partial and incomplete theories, too narrowly restricting their focus
2. Detail about the various recommendations being made may be found in FOREIGN
POLICY DECISION MAKING (B. Snyder, W. Bruck, & B. Sapin eds. 1963); K. DEUTSCH, THE
NEaVES OF GOVERNMENT (1963); A. KAPLAN, THE CONDUCT OF INQUIRY (1964); VARIETIES
OF POLITICAL THEORY (D. Easton ed. 1966); Kaplan, International Systems, 15 INT'L.
ENCYC. Soc. ScI. 479 (1968); CONTENDING APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (K. Knorr
8. J. Rosenau eds. 1969); Eisenstadt, The Development of Sociological Thought, 15 INT'L.
ENCYC. SOC. SCL. 23 (1968); W. RUNCIamAN, SOCIAL SCIENCE AND POLImCAL THEORY (1963);
READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPIY OF THE SOCIAL ScIENcES (M. Brodbeck ed. 1968); E. NAGEL, THE
STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE (1961); H. EULAu, THE BEHAVIORAL PERSUASION IN POLITICS (1963); and
R. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STiRUCUrE (1957).
3. A more limited view of scientific investigation is expressed by Professor Marion
Levy, "Does It Matter If He's Naked?" Bawled the Child, in CONTENDING APPROACHES TO
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, supra note 2, at 87; cf. Schwartz, A Learning Theory of Law,
41 S. CAL. L. REV. 548 (1968).
4. Derivational exercises in the syntactic dimension are illustrated in contemporary
"linguistic" approach. See, e.g., G. RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND (1949).
Some of the inadequacies of analysis largely confined to the "linguistic" are indi-
cated in, Weisstub, The Conceptual Foundations of the Interpretation of Agreement,
22 WORLD POLITICS 255 (1970).
5. An appropriate historical perspective is offered by such studies as M. LI, THE
POLITICAL THEORY OF THE ANCIENT WORLD (1965); E. HAVELOCK, THE LIBERAL TErPER
IN GREEK POLITICS (1957); Speiser, Cuneiform Law and the History of Civilization, 107
PRAC. AM. PHILOSOPHICAL Soc. 536 (1963); A. BOZEmAN, POLITICS AND CULTURE IN INTER.
NATIONAL HISTORY (1960); J. NEEDHAM, 2 SCIENCE AND CIVILIZATION IN CHINA (1956); G.
SEIDLER, THE EMERGENCE OF THE EASTERN WOaRL (1968); and R. POuND, IN rmP, rAnzoN
OF LEGAL HIsTR Y (1922).
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of inquiry and too severely limiting the intellectual tasks with which
they are concerned. 6 In few of the historic emphases have the stand-
point and purposes of the scholarly observer been clearly distinguished
from those of the more active participants in the social processes being
subjected to inquiry; much too often, instead of creating theories
about law which might facilitate comparisons through time and across
community boundaries, scholars have been content to frame their own
studies in terms of technical theories of law, mere shadowy and am-
biguous fragments of the data under observation.7 In many emphases,
still pervasive, authority has been conceived in transcendent terms-
such as divine will, metaphysical eternal verities, or autonomous legal-
isms-which do not admit of empirical inquiry. Quite commonly at-
tention is restricted to alleged rules of law, or largely unspecified
perspectives, to the neglect of the actual operations of legal process; a
clear focus upon empirical decision, or the aggregate flow of decision,
is thus not obtained. Authority and control are not always distin-
guished, and confused and ambiguous references are made simultane-
ously to both these indispensable components of law. Frequently, the
whole range of established decision-makers is not identified, and there
is little clear focus upon a comprehensive process of authoritative de-
cision, extending to the making as well as the application of law in the
maintenance of preferred public order. The events in social process
which give rise to claims to authoritative decision are seldom systemat-
ically categorized in value and institutional terms; hence, only anec-
dotal attention can be given to the causes and consequences of decision.
Characteristically, the complex interpenetration of patterns of author-
ity and control across territorial community lines is scarcely noted,
much less realistically described, and dubious myths are projected
about the interrelations of "national" and "international" interests
and law. In most of the emphases, the intellectual task most honored
in exercise is that of logical derivation, and the various other tasks
necessary to both effective inquiry and rational decision are largely
neglected.8
6. These limitations are apparent even in explicit consideration of the scope of juris-
prudence. See H. KANTOROWICZ, THrE DEFINITION OF LAw (1958); J. MoraosE, THE ScorE OF
JuRIsPRUDEN E (1965), reprinted from ME JuDicE; Bodenheimer, The Province of jurispru-
dence, 46 CoRN. L.Q. 1 (1960).
7. E. PATrERsON, JURISPRUDENCE 2, 3 (1953) notes, but does not develop a distinction
between theories of and about law. Past trends in recognition of such a distinction will be
noted in the discussion below of observational standpoints.
8. Documentation of these observations, which are developed in more detail in the
text below, may be found in any of the classic histories of legal philosophy or jurispru-
dential thinking. See R. POUND, I JURISPRUDENCE (1959); A. BRacn', POLrICAL Tsaony
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The inadequacies of our inherited theories for inquiry about law
are well illustrated in the oldest, and perhaps the most continuously
influential, emphasis of all, that of "natural law," which grounds
"authority" in transempirical sources." In this frame of reference the
task allocated to the jurist is avowedly theological or metaphysical: his
job is to put into effect on earth either the divine will or the require-
ments of certain postulated, or derived, transcendental essences. It
could not be surprising that scholars dominated by such conceptions
of authority would exhibit but minimum concern for the formulating
of comprehensive theory designed to facilitate inquiry about empirical
decision in its community context. Though the transempirical em-
phasis cannot, any more than other emphasis, entirely escape concern
for effective decision, its principal focus of attention has been, not
upon authoritative and controlling decision, but rather upon certain
limited types of justification for decision. The great historic
contribution of this emphasis has of course been in its appeals from
the realities of naked power to authority, and in its emphasis upon the
relevance of goals. It is common knowledge how much "natural law"
notions have aided both the development of modern national constitu-
tions and the recognition and development of international law.10 Too
often, however, the technique of goal clarification exemplified by the
theological or natural law emphasis has been that simply of logical
derivation, and it has not always carried its transempirical justifica-
tions of goals forward to the development of detailed specifications in
empirical terms. The important abiding difficulties with transempirical
justifications are that the same justifications can be employed to sup-
port diametrically opposed empirical specifications and that all such
justifications must remain vulnerable to short circuiting by rivals
(1959); H. CAIRNS, LEGAL PHILOSOPHY FRoar PLATO TO HEGEL (1949); J. JoNEs, HISTOICAL
INTRODUCTMON TO THE THEORY OF LAW (1940); C. FRIEDRICH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (2d ed. 1963); W. FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY (4th ed. 1960); J.
STONE, LEGAL SYSTEMS AND LAWYERS' REASONINGS (1968), HUMAN LAW AND HUMsAN JUSTICE
(1965), and SoCIAL DIMENSIONS OF LAW AND JUSTICE (1967); E. BODENHEIMER, JURISPRU-
DENCE (1962); G. PATON, A TEXTBOOK IN JURISPRUDENCE ch. I. (3d ed. 1964); G. SABINE,
A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORY (3d ed. 1961).
9. The temper of this variegated, diffuse emphasis may be sensed in A. Chroust,
On the Nature of Natural Law, in INTERPRETATIONS OF MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES 70-84
(P. Sayre ed. 1947); H. RomiEN, THE NATURAL LAW (T. Hanley transl. 1947); A. PASSmEIN
D'ENTREvEs, NATURAL LAw (1951); L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (2d ed. 1969); C.
BECKER, THE HEAVENLY CITY OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY PHILOSOPHIES (1932); and
Northrop, Naturalistic and Cultural Foundations for a More Effective International
Law, 49 YALE L.. 1430 (1950).
10. E. BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE 57 (1962) offers a concise summary of some of
the "practical achievements" of the natural law frame.
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which declare the primacy of more direct or recent revelations. In a
frame of reference not explicitly and systematically linked to human
choice in community process, even an orientation toward the various
other intellectual tasks required for effective inquiry and rational
choice would be incongruous.
The frame of reference emphasizing historical origins, which
reached its fullest flower in Europe and the United States nearly a hun-
dred years ago, did have the advantage of seeking to ground authority
in finite community process.11 Its difficulty was that its principal pro-
ponents radically misconceived such process. They sought authority
not so much in the actual perspectives of living peoples engaged in
cooperative activity in the maintenance of a community as in some
mythical disembodied geist thought to be unique to each particular
community. In this emphasis, law-like poetry or music-sprang from
the soul or common will of the people in a community, and every
community was different. It will be observed that some of these no-
tions are scarcely less mystical than those of the transempirical em-
phasis. The task of an observer was regarded as that of comprehending
the inner workings of a particular geist through intuitive understand-
ing; he had to immerse himself in the geist to extract the norm which
gave it meaning. Since every geist was unique, there could be no com-
prehensive map, transcending community boundaries or extending
through time in a single community, in terms of which observations
could be systematically organized and evaluated. Because of the almost
total immersion in community process, it was difficult for proponents
of this emphasis to obtain a clear focus upon particular authoritative
decisions and their relations to the larger contexts. For this reason,
they never devised a method, other than the largely anecdotal, even
for the historical task of describing past trends in decision for enrich-
ing the experience at the disposal of community decision-makers. The
potentialities of goal clarification they minimized because of a per-
vasive determinism; though geists could change as a result of deep
forces in a community, law could not control these forces and there
was especially little that a legislature could do. The deliberate inven-
tion of new alternatives in decision was a notion completely contra-
dictory of the underpinnings of their thought; law was not so much
11. The important perspectives are summarized in R. POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF
LEGAL HISTORY (1923) and I JURIsPRUDENCE, 81-87 (1959).
Note the sharp appraisal in Kantorowicz, Savigny and the Historical School of Law,
53 L. Q. REV. 326 (1937). See also H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAw (1881); J. CARTER, LAiW: ITS
ORIGIN, GROWTH, AND FUNCTION (1907); and P. VINOGRADOFF, OUTLINES OF HISTORICAL Ju-
RISPRUDENCE (1920-1922).
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the instrument of the regulation of social change as the passive con-
sequence of it. In an age in which man is becoming more and more
capable of reshaping both his physical and his cultural environment
and even of initiating changes in his own psychosoma, such an em-
phasis-as contrasted with deliberate and systematic effort to canvass
past experience for the guidance it can give to future choice--can
only be regarded as sentimental anachronism.
The frame of reference commonly described as "analytical" or "pos-
itivistic" jurisprudence which dominates thinking in much of the
world today was shaped by reaction against both the transempirical
notions of the theological or natural lawyers and the vague diffuseness
of the historical school.12 In contrasting emphasis it seeks to find
"authority" in systems of rules emanating from established officials.
For such purpose law is defined as the rules prescribed and applied by
distinctive institutions of authority-sovereigns, courts, and legisla-
tures-and jurisprudence is proclaimed as "the formal science of pos-
itive law."' 3 This hallmark of obsession with rules of law, as contrasted
with rules about law, was firmly implanted upon the frame by its most
influential proponent, John Austin, who insisted that the appropriate
scope of "general jurisprudence" consists, in the words of a distin-
guished contemporary expositor, "in the elucidation of fundamental
legal notions to be achieved by the analysis of the distinctive vocab-
ulary of the law and by the classification of its terms in such a way as
to bring out their logical interconnexions."'-4 Austin appeared also to
believe that there are "resemblances between different systems" which
are necessary as "bottomed in the common nature of man."',; It has
been observed even by friendly critics that such a position embodies
certain elements of the rejected natural law theories,16 as well as meta-
physical notions of transcendent categories, extracted by a priori pro-
12. Expositions contemporarily influential include J. AuSTiN, THE PROVINCE OF Ju-
RISPRuDENcE DETERmiNED AND THE UsEs OF THE STUDY OF JuRsPRUDENcE (Introduction by
H. L. A. Hart and Bibliographical Note) (1954); J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SouRCES OF LAw
(2d ed. 1921); H. KELSEN, GENEPAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (1945); E. PATrasoN, JURIS-
PRUDENCE (1953); and H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEt OF LAv (1962).
13. One famous crystallization of this perspective is that of T. E. HoLLAm, JusuS-
rRUDENCE ch. I (13th ed. 1924).
It is interesting that Holland foulnd even the Romans progressing from "a homely
and quite unscientific sense" of jurisprudence as "a knowledge of the law" to "the idea
of a science of those legal principles which exist independently of the institutions of any
particular country." Id. at 2, 3.
14. H. L. A. Hart, Introduction to JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE
DETERMINED AND THE UsEs OF THE STUDY OF JuRisPRUDENE at XV (1954).
15. Id. at 373.
16. Id. at XV.
1971]
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cedures;17 certainly, many contemporary adherents to this emphasis
appear to assume that legal rules can have a largely autonomous ref-
erence, different from community policy in context. When limited by
such perspectives, jurisprudence becomes of course more a "science"
of logical derivation of syntactic forms than an empirical science con-
cemed with causes and consequences in social process.18 In such an
emphasis, though it cannot ignore authoritative and controlling deci-
sion, decision is not observed directly as events in social process but
rather obliquely through the mirrors of ill-defined concepts and rules;
the focus is not so much upon flesh-and-blood decision-makers and
their choices in context as upon rules which purport to confer com-
petence.19 Authority and control are not clearly differentiated as twin
components of lawful decision, whole systems of rules are merely as-
sumed to be effective, and scholarship is exhausted by the description of
patterns in authoritative myth, without systematic investigation of the
degree to which they are in fact controlling. An emphasis explicitly
focused upon the institutions of the modem state and inspired by
exaggerated notions of sovereignty, unable to observe in the world
arena either appropriate centralized institutions or an identifiable
monopoly of force, has insoluble difficulty in accounting for the pat-
terns of authority and control transcending nation-state lines and must,
perforce invent a maze of mystical theories to explain the interrela-
tions of national and international law.2 0 An emphasis which ascribes
so high a potency to autonomous rules must, further, adopt a calcu-
lated obliviousness to many otherwise relevant intellectual tasks of
inquiry. When it is assumed that a system of theories of law can simul-
taneously describe what past decisions have been, predict what future
decisons will be, and state what future decisions ought to be, there
remains little place for more comprehensive and intensive inquiry
about what is in fact happening. The location of authority in auton-
omous rules does little to encourage the detailed clarification of basic
community policies from sources beyond the rules or even by a con-
textual interpretation of rules; the "analyst" is not allowed to state
17. J. MoNmRosE, THE ScoPE OF JURISPRUDENcE 3 (1965), reprinted from ME JUDiCE.
18. Though he regards his "imputation" as somehow different from derivation,
Kelsen is explicit in his effort to isolate authority from social process.
19. In his inaugural address, "Pericles and the Plumber" (The Queen's University
of Belfast, 1969), Professor W. L. Twining recalls "Langdell's idea 'that law is a science
... [and] that all the available materials of that science are contained in books'" (p. 5).
Cf. Woodard, The Limits of Legal Realism, An Historical Perspective, 54 VA. L. REv.
689, 699, 900 (1965).
20. This theme is developed in McDougal, Lasswell, & Reisman, Theories about In-
ternational Law: Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence, 8 VA. J. INT'L. L. 188 (1968).
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clearly to himself, or to anyone, the criteria upon which he relies to
choose among the alternatives made available by textual confrontation
and evaluation. The elaborate specification of the concatenations of
systems of rules falls far short of a careful description of past uni-
formities in decision of comparable cases in terms of degrees of approx-
imation to clarified community goals. When it is postulated that rules
are the factors that predominantly affect decision, inquiry for other
factors in predisposition and environment tends to get truncated.
When decision-makers are asserted to be under "obligaton" to make
future decision correspond to the rules employed in justifying past
decisions, the prediction of future decision becomes mere extrapola-
tion, as simple-minded as it is unreliable. The ultimate, integrative
task of inventing and evaluating new rules and institutions, better de-
signed to secure community policies, is not likely to be attended by
success, even when attempted, in the absence of the more adequate
performance of the other relevant tasks. A jurisprudence which can
contribute to a comprehensive program of inquiry about law only at
the expense of the integrity of its theory sometimes comes to be re-
garded as a "stench in the nostrils" of practical men.21
The various emphases subsumed under "sociological jurispru-
dence" and "the sociology of law," all inspired by accelerating devel-
opments in the natural and social sciences, have had the common
aspiration to bring inquiry about law, as well as law itself, into a more
realistic relation to the facts of social process. 22 It has not, however,
been characteristic of emphases in this frame to make direct and
frontal attacks upon traditional legal perspectives and techniques and
no great transformations of such perspectives and techniques have
been recommended. Thus, authority is found variously in "positive
enactment," "received ideals of the legal system," "taught tradition,"
"group convictions," "interests of individuals and groups," "the inner
order of associations," "jural postulates of civilization," "sacred tradi-
tion," and "faith." The principal innovation has been in a common
emphasis upon the scientific study of explanatory factors and social
consequences. Improvements during the past century in techniques of
21. Memory is that this characterization derives from A. V. Dicey.
22. The classic presentation is of course that of Dean Pound in I JURISPRUDENCE
ch. 6 (1959). His earlier Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence (pt. 1-3), 24
HAPV. L. REV. 591 (1911). 25 HAtv. L. REv. 140, 489 (1911-1912), is still a useful survey
of differing emphases. See also E. EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES or THE SOCIOLOGY
OF LAW (W. Moll transl. 1912).
A comprehensive, and highly persuasive, exposition of sociological perspectives is N.
TIsAsHEFF, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAWv (1939).
1971]
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inquiry and knowledge, first about the natural sciences and later about
the social sciences, gave scholars a new incentive to bring scientific
findings and skills to bear upon the study of law. Yet many of the
representatives of this new aspiration remained infected with mysti-
cisms from the natural law and historical emphases and few came
closer than had the analytical emphasis to an understanding of a com-
prehensive process of authoritative decision in context. Some of the
most creative proponents of the new emphasis have even sought to
keep their inquiries about law and their sociological investigations in
separate compartments, making a curious distinction between "socio-
logical jurisprudence" and "the sociology of law."' Lacking a clear
focus upon decision in their inquiries and ignoring the dependence of
the scientific task of inquiry upon all the other tasks, as upon goal
clarification for indications of importance, they have not made the con-
tributions to knowledge for which many had hoped. Goal clarification
has sometimes been eschewed as an unscientific operation and is often
permitted to regress toward traditional methods of philosophical spec-
ulation. Trend studies seldom present an organized, systematic flow of
comparable decisions in relation to their conditions and consequences
in social process. The search for conditions, though often appropriately
multi-factored in terms of environmental and predispositional varia-
bles, sometimes degenerates into a search for the "natural laws" of
social interaction. The projection of the future is not uncommonly
confined to intimations that "positive laws" which do not conform to
"the living law" will be ineffective. The deliberate invention and
evaluation of alternatives, save in the notable exception of the late
Dean Pound, is seldom recommended. Dean Pound, certainly the most
influential proponent of the sociological frame in the United States,
did for some decades make eloquent and articulate demands for a
"continuously more efficacious and social engineering,"24 but his own
working conception of law never fully escaped from the confines of
judicial techniques and rules, and he never elaborated his conception
of "interests" into a comprehensive and homogeneous set of categories
in aid of performance of the various relevant intellectual tasks. The
sociological school of jurisprudence clearly has still not risen to the
task of taking full advantage of the findings and techniques of modern
sociological inquiry.
Within the broad sociological frame, some emphases, in the name
23. One who makes this distinction is Max Weber. See M. WEnER, ON LAw AND
ECONOMY IN SoCiErY 11 et. seq. (M. Rheinstein ed. 1954).
24. R. PouND, SoCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW (1942).
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of providing a superior picture of the empirical world and a strategic
guide to policy within it, have seized upon a single factor for the ex-
planation of man, society, and law. The most influential emphasis of
this kind, perhaps in fact more metaphysical and pseudo-historical
than sociological, owes its origin primarily to Marx and Engels who
found what they regarded as a golden key in the primacy of "material"
over "ideological" factors.25 From this premise, they asserted a law of
historical development to which they ascribed overwhelming potency
in the past and future of human association. 26 Explanations that stress
a single factor as of predominating importance are, however, in a pe-
culiarly vulnerable position as knowledge advances. During the past
century in particular an enormous accumulation of empirical studies
has occurred: in the early years of the nineteenth century the psycho-
logical and social sciences had few practitioners; by the middle of the
twentieth century they could be numbered in tens of thousands. It
has, thus, become increasingly clumsy to divide all factors in psycho-
logical and social processes into "material" and "nonmaterial." Any
attempt to do so must mean that a scholar will be compelled to spend
his time making definitions whose significance is of dubious importance
for the furtherance of inquiry. A two-valued system can, of course, be
made to serve some purposes of investigation, but its utility is modest,
and it greatly increases the hazards of rigidifying an entire approach
into empty dialectic, unrewarded and unaided by the findings of com-
petent inquiry. In the light of contemporary knowledge, it would
appear much more productive to conceive of psychological and social
processes as multi-factored, and to get ahead with the task of exploring
the many relevant interdeterminances.
The relatively recent frame of reference known as "American
Legal Realism," sometimes described as having been deeply bitten by
"the sociological prejudice,"2 7 has in fact gone much beyond sociolog-
ical jurisprudence in the comprehensiveness, directness, and intensity
of its attack upon inherited legal theories and procedures.28 The prin-
25. For brief review, see H. KEsEN, THE COMMUNIST TBEoRY OF LAW (1955); R.
SCHLESINGER, SoviEr LE.GAL THEORY (1945).
26. Because of this emphasis, many proponents might equally plausibly be grouped
in the "historical" or "natural law" approaches.
27. E. PATrERSON, JuRIsPRuDENCE 541 (1953), ascribing the characterization to H.
Kantorowicz, Some Rationalism about Realism, 43 YAi. L. J. 1240, 1246 (1943). The
Kantorowicz article, despite its great influence is a thin and uncomprehending piece,
finding little of merit in the American realists that was not anticipated by the European
sociologists.
28. The genuine contributions of the realist movement are perhaps best appreciated
in the collecter essays of some of its raajor proponents. See, e.g., W. HoHFED, Fumnawas-
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cipal tenet of this frame has been its insistence that law is instrumental
only to social ends and, building upon Mr. Justice Holmes' "consider-
ations of what is expedient for the community,"'29 it has consistently,
if not always explicitly, found authority in peoples' empirical perspec-
tives about social consequences. Its most important contribution has
perhaps been in its largely novel emphasis, first popularized by Judge
Jerome Frank and later adopted by many others, that law is most
fruitfully conceived as decision in the sense of sanctioned authoritative
choice. Indeed, some proponents of the frame, under the influence of
a behaviorist psychology, have unfortunately carried the emphasis so
far as to minimize the perspectives of authority attending choice in an
exaggerated concern for "operations" and effectiveness. In their more
constructive efforts the American realists have seized with great gusto
upon anthropology, psychoanalysis, learning theory, sociology, social
psychology, economics and related disciplines and exploited the find-
ings of these several fields in their particular studies; they have flung
the doors wide to any reporter of new discoveries in the expanding
science of man. In particular, they have noted and decried the norma-
tive-ambiguity ° and the complementarity of the technical concepts
and rules of law which traditional theory proffered for the simultane-
ous performance of the descriptive, scientific, predictive, and prefer-
ential tasks. In lieu of the customary historical studies of the literary
evolution of such concepts and rules they have insisted upon the care-
ful description of past trends of decision in terms of narrow categoriza-
tions of the facts giving rise to the appeal to authoritative decision and
of the choices actually made. Rejecting the notion that decisions
are "the products of logical pathogenesis born of pre-exist-
TAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS (W. Cook ed. 1923); K. LLmVELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN
THEORY AND PRACtiCE (1962); F. COHEN, TE LEGAL CONSCIENCE (1960); J. FRANK, A MAN'S
REACH (1965). Cf. the provocative J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930).
Influential early articles are Bingham, What is the Law, 11 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1912);
Cook, Scientific Method and the Law, 13 A.BA.J. 303 (1927); Oliphant, A Return to Stare
Decisis, 14 A.B.A.J. 71, 159 (1928); H. Oliphant &c A. Hewitt, Introduction to REurF, Farto
THE PHYsIcAL TO THE SOCIAL SCIENCEs (1930).
A famous negative appraisal is Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REv.
429 (1934). Cf. McDougal, Fuller vs. The American Legal Realists, 50 YALE L.J. 828 (1940).
Comprehensive references may be found in W. RUMBLE, JR., AMERICAN LEGAL REAL-
ISm (1968); Rostow, American Legal Realism and the Sense of the Profession, 34 RocKY
MT. L. REV. 1 (1962).
29. 0. HoLwMs, THE COMMON LAw 35, 36 (1881).
30. The reference is to disguised statements of preference-in terms of description,
scientific statement, or prediction-for which the speaker does not take explicit responsi.
bility. Lasswell Sc McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training
in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203, 267 (1943).
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ing legal principles,"31 they have spelled out in detail the thesis that
judges are human and, hence, responsive to all the variables in predis-
position and environment which typically shape the conduct of all men.
They have not had high expectations about the possibilities of predicting
particular future decisions under the best of circumstances, but have
suggested that the chances of successful anticipation could be greatly
enhanced by taking into acount the whole range of conditions affect-
ing past decision and their probable future collocations. Calling for a
deliberate and relatively clear specification of empirical social ends,
they have demanded, and often supplied, an equally deliberate survey
and evaluation of the available alternatives in doctrine, institutions,
and procedures for securing such ends. Yet none of the American real-
ists, despite this deep concern for the consequences of decision and the
impact of law upon human beings, have ever developed a comprehen-
sive set of value and institutional categories, or a systematic set of
procedures, for goal clarification and the other tasks, to aid them in
their study and appraisal of decisions. The abstractions which they
have formulated are almost exclusively low-level abstractions, 32 and
the problems with which they work, in the absence of a comprehensive
guiding theory, can be related to each other only anecdotally.
The many important contributions of the American legal realists
cannot, thus, be said to be much more than preliminary to the affirm-
ative problems of jurisprudence 3 The vivid assault of the early real-
ists upon verbal "slot machine" conceptions of legal process did suc-
ceed, at least temporarily, in shaking loose incrustations of misplaced
confidence in the pursuit of legal analytics. Yet there is a limit beyond
which the laborious demonstration of equivalencies in the language of
the courts cannot go: eventually the critic must offer constructive
guidance as to what and how courts and other decision-makers should
decide upon the whole range of problems importantly affecting public
order. Similarly, some of the realists have done little service to "sci-
ence" and scarcely more to "law" by merely proclaiming the virtues
of scientific modes of thought and investigation. It is a disservice to
science to exaggerate the contribution which science alone can make
to the policy questions that are the distinctive problems with which
lawyers are confronted. Science is sometimes said to be "value free";
31. F. COLEN, THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE 75 (1960).
32. Llewellyn, Frank, Cohen, Arnold, Sturges, etc. were interested in very specific
legal reforms. E.g., Llewellyn's contribution to the Uniform Commercial Code.
33. Cf. C. Woodard, The Limits of Legal Realism: An Historical Perspective, 54
VA. L. R,.. 689 (1968).
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and yet the most obvious fact about policy is that it is value oriented,
since policy is only intelligible when it is seen as a deliberate search
for the maximization of valued goals. To exaggerate the role of science
is to prepare the ground for disillusionment with the relevancy
of scientific modes of thinking and to discount the usefulness of the
available results of scientific inquiry. "Built-in" potentiality for dis-
illusionment is hardly to be commended among the specifications for
a jurisprudential theory. The tie between the issues that rise in the
clarification of value goals and the findings of science is so intimate
that it must be the province of relevant theories about legal process
to emphasize and assess these relationships rather than to overlook and
evade rational assessment of their significance.
The inference we draw from our examination of past theories
about law is, thus, that a jurisprudence which would serve the pur-
poses of a free society must seek both a more comprehensive and a
more penetrating frame of references, after the aspiration of the most
advanced modem theories in other fields of inquiry about social pro-
cess. The formidable challenge to legal scholars today is, in the lan-
guage much abused by repetition, to create a jurisprudence which is
"relevant": such a jurisprudence will find authority, not in theological
or metaphysical or autonomous abstractions, but rather, in a concep-
tion known since at least six centuries before Christ,3 4 in the perspec-
tives of living community members-their demands for values, their
identifications with others, and their expectations about the require-
ments of decision for securing their demanded values in all their com-
munities-and it will provide, and apply, theory and procedures ap-
propriate to implementing this conception of authority. From this
man-centered, universalist and equalitarian perspective, the challenge
is not merely to seek to resolve issues connected with law by "defini-
tion," but rather to relate authoritative decision to preferred public
order. Though definitions are a part of life, by themselves they tell us
nothing about life. Properly managed definitions are tools of discov-
ery, since they guide attention to the social process itself where human
beings are perpetually engaged in the never-ending transactions by
which values are shaped and shared. Legal institutions, which are a
part of the process of value shaping and sharing, must be appraised
according to the contributions which they make to value outcomes
and institutions. In any community, the legal system is but a part of a
more inclusive system, the system of public order, which includes a
34. Cf. E. ImVErocK, THE LIBEmRL TEMPER IN GREnt POLIICS passim (1957).
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preferred pattern for the distribution of values and a preferred pattern
of basic institutions. The appropriate scope of inquiry into any legal
system is, therefore, to appraise its significance for the system of public
order which it expected to protect and fulfill. A relevant jurispru-
dence will define the full breadth and depth of this undertaking and
identify the methods by which the pertinent tasks can be performed.
In the aggregate, a legal system is to be appraised in terms of the val-
ues to be maximized in the total context of public order. The overall
task of inquiry is, hence, to assess the degree of success or failure of the
system, to account for the factors that condition these results, and to
clarify the goals and the policy alternatives available in the emerging
future. The indispensable function of a relevant jurisprudence must
be to assist this inquiry by delimiting an economic frame of reference
for studying the interrelations of law and social process and by speci-
fying in detail the intellectual tasks by which such study can be made
and applied to the solution of the exigent problems it reveals. A juris-
prudence which would effectively serve the needs of both scholars and
specialists in decision, and indeed of all who would understand and
affect the social processes in which they live, must, accordingly, be
comprised of a systematic, flexible, and configurative approach, exhib-
iting at least four major emphases:
1. It must achieve clarity in distinguishing the observational
standpoints of the scholar and decision-maker, and in aid of en-
lightenment, as well as of decision, develop a theory about law,
and not merely of law.
2. It must establish a focus of attention both comprehensive
and selective, effectively relating authoritative decision to the
larger social and community processes by which it is affected and
which it in turn affects.
3. It must identify the whole range of intellectual tasks rele-
vant to problem-solving about the interrelations of law and social
process, and it must specify economic and effective procedures for
the performance of each of these tasks.
4. It must make explicit, in all necessary degrees of abstrac-
tion and precision, the values which are postulated, or assumed,
to be at stake in decision and inquiry.
Clarity about observational standpoint is important because the
objectives of the scholar and those of the authoritative decision-maker,
the professional advocate, the effective power holder, and the com-
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munity member may be very different. The primary concern of the
scholar must be, as we have indicated, for enlightenment about the
aggregate interrelationships of authoritative decision and other as-
pects of community process, while the authoritative decision-maker
and others may be more interested in power, in the making of effective
choices in conformity with demanded public order. If the scholarly
observer does not adopt perspectives different from those either of the
community member making claims or of the authoritative decision-
maker who responds to such claims, he can have no criteria for ap-
praising the rationality in terms of community interest of either claims
or decision. Hence, what the scholarly observer requires is a theory
about law, designed to facilitate performance of the pertinent tasks in
inquiry about decision, as distinguished from the theories of law
which are employed by decision-makers and others for obtaining and
justifying outcomes within the decision process and are, thus, among
the variables about which the scholar seeks enlightenment. Good the-
ory about law may of course on occasion be found useful by decision-
makers and, hence, also become in the course of time a part of theo-
ries of law; similarly, good theories of law may sometimes be sufficiently
precise and relevant to serve particular purposes of the scholar in his
more comprehensive inquiry. Yet it can only compound confusion if
the very different observational standpoints and purposes attending
the use of the same or comparable signs are not kept in mind.
The comprehensiveness and realism with which an observer con-
ceives his major focus of attention-what he regards as law and how
he locates it in its larger community context-are important because
they determine how he conceives every detailed part of his study: his
framing of problems, his choice of tools and procedures, and his rec-
ommendation of alternatives.35 When inquiry is focused only upon
rules of law-perspectives-to the exclusion of actual choices or prac-
tices-operations-there can be no assurance that it will have any rele-
vance to what is actually happening in a community. When considera-
tions of authority are overemphasized, with relative neglect of control
or effective power, the outcomes of inquiry may have little bearing
upon the future course of law and public order; similarly, when naked
power is overemphasized at the expense of authority, inquiry may not
be appropriately creative. When law is conceived only as rules applied
by courts or other agencies, there may be disastrous neglect of how
35. Anyone who questions whether conceptions of law make a difference might con-
trast the majority and dissenting opinions in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 876
U.S. 598 (1964).
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rules are made, as well as of other important aspects of the compre-
hensive process of authoritative decision. When law is regarded as
something mystical or autonomous and distinct from community pol-
icy, no inquiry is admitted, or tools afforded, for relating decisions to
the events in social process to which they are a response and, in turn,
affect. When neat distinctions are made between the characteristics of
national and international law, and national law is regarded as isolated
from the larger world about it, it becomes impossible either to account
for many important factors which affect decision or rationally to clarify
policies for the various interpenetrating communities which in fact
embrace the activities of man. A relevant jurisprudence must, in sum,
seek a comprehensiveness and realism in focus which will encourage
both a systematic, configurative examination of all the significant vari-
ables affecting decision and the rational appraisal of the aggregate
value consequences of alternatives in decision.
The appropriate specification of a comprehensive set of intellec-
tual tasks, or skills, is important because it is the range of tasks per-
formed, as well as the quality of performance, which determines the
relevance of inquiry for policy. The most deliberate attempts to clarify
general community policy which do not at the same time systematically
pursue other tasks, such as the description of past trends in decision
and the analysis of factors affecting decision, may achieve only Utopian
exercises. The description of past trends in decision, which is not
guided by policy priorities and explicitly related to social processes,
affords a most meager basis for drawing upon the wisdom of the past.
The scientific study of factors affecting decision, which is not oriented
by reference to problems in basic community policy, may be of no
more than incidental relevance, despite enormous cost. The effort to
predict future trends in decision by the mere extrapolation of past
trends, without considering whether the factors that affect decision
will remain the same, may produce destructive illusion rather than
genuine forecast. In confusion about the character of, and appropriate
procedures for, the different relevant intellectual tasks, the creativity
in the invention and evaluation of policy alternatives, which is indis-
pensable to rational decision, may be lost. For traditional exercises in
derivational logic and the sterile pursuit of meaningless questions, a
relevant jurisprudence will substitute the systematic and disciplined
employment of a whole series of distinguishable but interrelated intel-
lectual tasks.
The explicit postulation of a comprehensive set of goal values is
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important, finally, not merely for the promotion of a preferred public
order, but also as affecting the economic performance of the various
relevant intellectual tasks. It is seldom questioned today that authori-
tative decision, in both particular and aggregate, has important im-
pacts upon the distribution of values in a community; conversely, it is
equally common knowledge that perspectives about value distribution,
entertained by both authoritative decision-makers and community
members, are among the most significant variables affecting decision.
The scholarly observer is, further, inextricably a part of community
process; he, like other community members, is incurably affected by
preferences about value distribution, and the enlightenment (or ob-
scurantism) which he achieves in inquiry must have inescapable effects
upon community process. Just as there can be no neutral or autono-
mous theories of law, in the sense of rules devoid of policy content, so
also there can be no indifferent theories about law, in the sense of
knowledge or ignorance, without policy consequences. In the context
of these exigencies, it is the unique opportunity of observers special-
ized to inquiry about law not merely to relate law to its past policy
content, but rather, and further, to clarify and promote the policies
best designed to serve the particular kind of public order for which
they are willing to commit themselves with their fellow community
members. It is only by the deliberate clarification of, and explicit
commitment to, basic community goals-at all levels of abstraction
and from both short-term and long-term time perspectives-that de-
pendable, creative, and economic guidance can be given to the exam-
ination of past trends, the allocation of effort to the assessment of fac-
tors affecting decision, and the evaluation of future probabilities and
alternatives.
When jurisprudence is conceived in this recommended broad
reach, it scarcely requires argument that everyone seriously concerned
with inquiry about law-established official, effective decision-maker,
advocate, community member, or scholarly observer-employs some
kind of jurisprudence, however effective or ineffective and however
consciously or unconsciously it may be held. Just as the human being
tends to place any perception of the environment or of the self within
a whole set of assumptions which give such perception meaning and
significance, so also an observer of matters legal tends to locate these
in a larger context of assumption about causes and consequences.
Thus, the experienced lawyer may have a rich and varied body of ex-
pectations about the probable responses of different judges to different
doctrines, styles of argument, and types of parties involved in contro-
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versies. He may predict that one judge is heavily disposed to side with
the prosecutor, while another seems to regard the defendant in actions
to which the government is party as a weak and tragic figure who
stands alone. Whether these perspectives are true or false, they are part
of a significant set of assumptions about legal process which can be
distinguished from the conventional language of legal doctrine. The
more skilled the observer or practitioner the more comprehensive and
explicit his assumptions about the larger context in which he operates
are likely to be. One task of a relevant jurisprudence must of course
be to bring all these vague assumptions-of varying degrees of com-
prehensiveness, consciousness, explicitness, and realism-to a clear fo-
cus of attention for rational evaluation and, perhaps, for renovation
into more systematic and dependable knowledge.
II. GOAL CRITERIA FOR A CONFIGURATIVE
JURISPRUDENCE
For elaborating the goal criteria we recommend for a more relevant
theory about law, it will be convenient to organize our discussion
about the four major emphases indicated above:
1. The establishment of observational standpoint.
2. The delimitation of the focus of inquiry.
3. The performance of intellectual tasks.
4. The explicit postulation of public order goals.
The recommendations we make are addressed to all who are con-
cerned to improve our theory about law, to increase our knowledge of
the reciprocal impacts of legal and social process, and thereby to en-
hance the quality of both law and public order in all our communities.
A. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF OBSERVATIONAL STANDPOINT
The principal distinction which requires to be made is, as we have
seen, that between the scholarly observer, whose primary concern is
for enlightenment, and the authoritative decision-maker and others
whose ultimate interest is in power, in the making of effective choices.
It must of course be recognized that the scholar, the authoritative
decision-maker, the advocate or counsellor, and the interested commu-
nity member may all require the same enlightenment and may all find
it necessary to engage in the same or comparable intellectual tasks in
the course of rational inquiry and rational decision. The enlighten-
ment which the scholarly observer achieves and communicates must,
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further, have inevitable effects upon the intelligence and promotion
functions of authoritative decision,2 6 and the scholarly may on occa-
sion deliberately assume active decision-making roles in the gathering
of intelligence and promotion of policy. Yet it remains that for de-
pendable, realistic, and effective inquiry and knowledge the scholar
must distinguish himself and his purposes and procedures from the
events which he has under observation, including the purposes and
procedures of the participants in those events. It is of the utmost im-
portance that the scholar create and maintain a functional theory
which enables him realistically to perform the indispensable intellec-
tual tasks in reference to the flow of authoritative decisions and the
accompaniment of conventional theories employed to explain and jus-
tify decisions. If he permits the perspectives and communicative signs
of the participants in legal and social process, which are a part of the
data he is observing, to dominate his own perspectives and instru-
ments of inquiry and communication, the consequences can only be
intellectual confusion, distortion in perception and report, and loss
of the enlightenment toward which his scholarly specialization is di-
rected.
In emphasizing the importance of clarity in the scholar's percep-
tion of his unique standpoint and role, it is not our suggestion that he
can, or should, completely isolate himself from participation in social
and community process. On the contrary, it is our strong recommenda-
tion that the scholar should be as conscious as possible of the different
communities with which he identifies, of which he is a member, and
upon which he as unavoidable impacts. His most appropriate identifi-
cations are with the whole of the different communities, often concen-
tric in their territorial reach and interpenetrating in their functional
value processes, in which he participates, and the enlightenment he
seeks should be that relevant to clarifying and implementing the com-
mon interests of all the members of these communities. It is the spe-
cial role of the scholar-seeking to make appropriate discount for the
biases of his cultural background, class and group memberships, per-
sonality formation, and previous experience-to assume a vantage
point different from that either of the active community participants
who make claims before processes of authoritative decision or of the
authoritative decision-makers who respond to such claims, and from
this vantage point to clarify and identify for the different participants
36. These terms are defined in the text below. For elaboration see McDougal, Lass-
well, & Reisman, The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, 19 J. OF
LEcAL. E . 253, 403 (1967).
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in community process the common interests which they themselves
may not have been able to perceive.
For discounting the biases conditioned by culture, class, interest,
personality, and so on, and previous exposure to crisis, the contempo-
rary scholar may, when necessary, take advantage of the broad knowl-
edge and specialized procedures made available by modern psychologi-
cal and behavioral science.
The establishment and maintenance of an appropriate scholarly
standpoint does not necessarily require the development of some eso-
teric meta-language, employing words different from those ordinarily
employed by lawyers and social scientists. What is required, however,
is a set of words or system of signs, including more than words or
word-substitutes, both sufficiently comprehensive and sufficiently pre-
cise, to make reference to all the significant features of the total con-
text of legal and social process, and that these words or signs be em-
ployed in a functional, rather than conventional, sense. It is futile to
hope, as so many scholars have hoped, that the confusions which so
readily arise from multiple usage can be avoided by attempting to coin
new terms as the exclusive idiom of jurisprudential theory. Systematic
writers are part of society and as such are in more or less direct com-
munication with practitioners who are concerned with the legal process
of a local community or of the world community as a whole. Even
systems of expression that contain many new words may succeed in
making certain conceptions so articulate that these initial idiosyncra-
cies are incorporated within written codes, opinions and briefs. In the
process of dissemination these words are likely to become detached
from the original definitions put forward by the systematizer. If con-
fusions are to be kept at a minimum, the prophylaxis is neither the
adoption of esoteric vocabularies nor timidity in introducing new
terms in order to sharpen distinctions which are dimly perceived in
ordinary usage. The appropriate strategy is to propagate intellectual
skill in maintenance of observational standpoint and performance of
relevant intellectual tasks. The pertinent skill enables a word-user to
locate his position in the total context of communication, and delib-
erately to choose whether to employ particular terms in a sense that is
conventional within a given legal system, or according to definitions
that are chosen to perform the distinctive functions of jurisprudence.
The well-instructed manipulator of language has intellectual tools en-
abling him to hold his vocabulary at arm's length and to select the la-
bel appropriate to the role which he has chosen to play. Hence the
same label may be employed-quite deliberately-in several senses;
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and different labels may be attached to the same conceptual frame.
These choices will depend upon a host of factors connected with the
many forums in which the individual scholar finds himself participat-
ing.
B. THE DELIMITATION OF THE Focus OF INQUIRY
The most important criteria for delimiting the focus of inquiry are
comprehensiveness and appropriate selectivity. The comprehensive-
ness and the realism in detail with which a focus is delimited affect
both how particular problems are formulated and the dependability
and economy with which the different relevant intellectual tasks can
be brought to bear upon such problems. The broadest reach of an ap-
propriately contextual, configurative jurisprudence must extend to the
whole of the social and community processes in which authoritative
decision is an interacting component; yet a viable theory must offer
concepts and procedures which will facilitate a focus in whatever pre-
cision may be necessary upon particular decisions and particular flows
of decisions.
The principal emphases of a focus of the required comprehensive-
ness and selectivity are not difficult to formulate. The central spotlight
in such a focus will be empirically and explicitly upon authoritative
decision. Decision will be observed as effective choice, composed of
both perspectives and operations Perspectives will be seen to include
expectations about both authority and control, and inquiry will be
made about both patterns of authority and patterns of control in fact.
Law will be regarded not merely as rules or as isolated decision, but as
a continuous process of authoritative decision, including both the con-
stitutive and public order decisions by which a community's policies
are made and remade. The processes of authoritative decision in any
particular community will be seen to be an integral part, in an endless
sequence of causes and effects, of the whole social process of that com-
munity. Every particular community will, finally, be observed to affect,
and be affected by, a whole complex of parallel and concentric, inter-
penetrating communities, from local through regional to global.
If it be questioned whether a focus of this comprehensiveness is
really necessary, some of the imperatives for effective performance of
the different relevant intellectual tasks may be recalled. The clarifica-
tion of community policies can scarcely proceed rationally without
taking into account, in so far as economy permits, the aggregate conse-
quences of alternative choices; small gains with respect to one value
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or in the short run may be offset by large losses with respect to another
value or in the long run. The description of past trends in decision
will not produce dependable knowledge if not made in terms of com-
parisons across boundaries and through time, in a context of causes
and consequences; without an examination of the larger social and
community context one cannot know, further, whether all relevant
past experience has been observed. The effective performance of the
scientific task of identifying significant environmental and predisposi-
tional variables must require, because of the interdependence of social
and community processes, a map of the larger context of such pro-
cesses. The forecast of future decisions, in whatever degree it can be
made effective, is obviously dependent upon the prior effective perfor-
mance of the descriptive and scientific tasks. The greater the range of
alternatives considered in the management of social and decision pro-
cesses, the greater of course the chances of creativity and success in the
invention and evaluation of new alternatives in policy.
Each of the emphases specified for appropriate comprehensiveness
and selectivity in focus may be briefly developed.
1. A Balanced Emphasis Upon Perspectives and Operations
Our recommended theory will, as indicated, characterize law as in-
cluding both perspectives and operations, without exaggerated empha-
sis upon either technical rules of law (ambiguously assumed to de-
scribe perspectives) or bare physical operations (what decision-makers
can be observed to do). A central focus will be sought explicitly upon
decision, as including both perspectives (the subjectivities attending
choice) and operations (the choices actually made and enforced by
threats of severe deprivations or promises of extreme indulgences). In-
quiry will be directed in balanced emphasis toward the patterns in
subjectivities and operations, and the interrelations of these patterns,
which prevail in a continuous flow of decision.
By this emphasis the formal, manifest content of the perspectives
expressed in conventional rules of law may be pierced for detailed ex-
amination of the choices in fact made through their invocation and
application. Yet perspectives may still be studied, perhaps even more
realistically, as among the several factors importantly affecting choice.
It will be observed that in a pluralistic community,37 such as ex-
37. For illustration of the complementarity in legal principles, see B. CAMozo, THE
PARADoxEs OF LEGAL ScIXEcE (1928); Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A.J. 71,
159 (1928); I. ARNoLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GovRmuaTnrT (1935).
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hibited in most organized groupings of men and even in the largest
earth-space community, technical rules of law are commonly created
in sets of complementary opposites to express all pluralistic interests,
and that the quality of the public order a particular community
achieves is determined by the aggregate flow of the specific choices by
which such complementary rules are related to specific instances. In-
quiry which would be consequential must extend beyond mere con-
cern for the complementary rules alone to identification of the factors
that affect the detailed relation in specific instances and to evaluation
of the consequences of alternative choices.
2. Clarity in Conception of Both Authority and Control
Our recommended theory will characterize law, further, not merely as
decision, but as authoritative decision, in which elements of both au-
thority and control are combined. By authority we mean participation
in decision in accordance with community perspectives about who is
to make what decisions and by what criteria; the reference is empiri-
cal, to a certain frequency in the perspectives of the people who con-
stitute a given community. By control we mean effective participation
in decision-making and execution-that choice in outcome is realized
in significant degree in practice. When decisions are authoritative but
not controlling, they are not law but pretense; when decisions are con-
trolling but not authoritative, they are not law but naked power.
Our recommended theory will make inquiry about perspectives
of authority both establishing certain decision-makers (who is autho-
rized to make what decisions, with respect to whom, and by what pro-
cedures) and indicating appropriate criteria for decision, relating to
the scope, range, and domain of the values authorized to be affected
and to the detailed shapings and sharings of values regarded as appro-
priate for particular contexts. It will observe whether these concep-
tions are empirically or transempirically grounded, whether regarded
as a part of the social process or transcendent of the social process, and
whether presented as demand or non-demand. When the perspectives
of authority observed are demand conceptions (formulated in terms of
the volition or preference of participant conceiving them), it will be
noted whether they relate to social process values, asserted "autono-
mous oughts" of legal prescription, the lessons of history, consistency
in logical or syntactical operations, ethical norms, or other undefined
rectitude norms.
Our recommended theory will regard control as a function of
many interrelated variables and will project empirical inquiry about
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the factors which in fact affect decision. It will be concerned with tra-
ditional notions of "obligation" and "binding" only insofar as these
notions realistically reflect the subjectivities of participants in an arena.
It will systematically investigate the role of non-official groups, includ-
ing political parties, pressure groups and private associations.
In this conception, it is not necessary to stipulate some single ra-
tio of coincidence of authority and control as necessary for "law."
When different ratios are discovered, they can be compared with one
another for scholarly and policy purposes. The critical task is not to
fix upon a preferred ratio but to ascertain the patterns in the relation
between authority and control that have occurred, probably will oc-
cur, can be made to occur, and are recommended to occur in particu-
lar contexts.
By these emphases, both authority and control can be subjected
to systematic and disciplined inquiry through employment of all the
techniques of modern science.
3. Comprehensiveness in Conception of Processes of Authoritative
Decision
Our recommended theory will, in still further detail, extend its focus
beyond occasional or isolated authoritative decisions, to the whole con-
tinuous process of authoritative and controlling decision by which a
community shapes and shares its values.38 In any community, this pro-
cess of authoritative and controlling decision, as an integral part of a
more comprehensive process of effective power, can be seen to be com-
posed of two different kinds of decisions: first, the decisions which es-
tablish and maintain the most comprehensive process of authoritative
decision and, secondly, the flow of particular decisions which emerge
from the process so established for the regulation of all the other com-
munity value processes. The first of these types of decision may be con-
veniently described as "constitutive," and the second as "public or-
der."3
9
For the comprehensive and economic description of a process of
38. The notion of law as a process of decision is found in H. M. HART & A. SACKS,
Tim LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLIMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW
(tent. ed. 1958). What we would add is a more comprehensive conception of processes of
authoritative decision and the systematic relation of such processes to their context in
social and community processes.
39. To be completely homogeneous we would say "other public order," since the
protected features of power processes, as of other value processes, may be conveniently
regarded as a component of a community's most comprehensive public order. It is this
most comprehensive sense of "public order" which we contrast with "civic order."
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decision, as of other social processes, it is necessary to employ some sys-
tematic set of terms (the precise words do not matter if equivalences
can be made clear) to refer to the participants in the process, their
perspectives (demands, identifications, expectations), the situations of
intersection, the base values at the disposal of participants, the strate-
gies employed in management of base values, and the immediate out-
comes and long-term effects achieved.
In the terms we find convenient, the "constitutive process" of a
community may be described as the decisions which identify and char-
acterize the different authoritative decision-makers, specify and clarify
basic community policies, establish appropriate structures of authority,
allocate bases of power for sanctioning purposes, authorize procedures
for making the different kinds of decisions, and secure the continuous
performance of all the different kinds of decision functions (intelli-
gence, promotion, prescription, etc.) necessary to making and admin-
istering general community policy.
In complementary terms, the "public order" decisions of a com-
munity may be described as those, emerging in continuous flow from
the constitutive process, which shape and maintain the protected fea-
tures of the community's various value processes. These are the deci-
sions which determine how resources are allocated and developed, and
wealth produced and distributed; how human rights are promoted
and protected or deprived; how enlightenment is encouraged or re-
tarded; how health is fostered, or neglected; how rectitude and civil
responsibility are matured; and so on through the whole gamut of de-
manded values.
It will be obvious in any community that an intimate relationship
exists between constitutive process and public order. The economy
and effectiveness of the constitutive process a community can achieve
vitally affects the freedom, security, and abundance of its public order,
while the quality of the public order a community attains, in turn af-
fects the viability of the constitutive process it can maintain. By dis-
tinguishing, however, between these two different types of decisions,
and seeking systematic coverage of both, inquiry may avoid destructive
fixation upon the mere application of allegedly given rules and vacu-
ous controversies about the differences between "political" and "legal"
decisions, and may appropriately extend its concern to all relevant fea-
tures of the processes by which law is made and applied and their con-
sequences for preferred public order.
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The conventional description of the different phases in authorita-
tive decision which we describe as "authority functions" is in such
terms as "legislative," "executive," "judicial," and "administrative,"
but these terms would appear to refer more to authority structures
than functions. Inquiry seeking both greater precision and compre-
hensiveness in describing authority functions might distinguish the
following (or their equivalents):
Intelligence: Obtaining information about the past, making es-
timates of the future, planning.
Promoting: Urging proposals.
Prescribing: Projecting authoritative policies.
Invoking: Confronting concrete situations with provisional
characterization in terms of a prescription to con-
crete circumstances.
Applying: Final characterization and execution of a prescrip-
Terminating:
Appraising:
tion in a concrete situation.
Ending a prescription or arrangement within the
scope of a prescription.
Comparison between goals and performance.
Careful delimitation of the flow of decision in social process may
enable the scientific observer and the decision-making participant to
distinguish between two interacting realms of social order, the public
order and the civic order. The total public order, as the analyst can
make explicit, includes the relatively stable features of the power pro-
cess (the constitutive patterns) and the protected and encouraged fea-
tures of all value-institution processes other than power. Since public
order is characterized by severely sanctioned commitments (in expec-
tation and realization), civil order is the realm of milder sanction. Ir-
respective of the terminology employed, equivalent distinctions must
be made articulate in a theory that is adequately fashioned to meet
the issues pertinent to a comprehensive system of jurisprudence.
4. The Relation of Law to Social Process
A theory about law which would even approximate relevance will re-
late authoritative decision not merely explicitly, but systematically, to
the larger social process that envelops such decision. It is changes in
the distribution of values in social process, when values are conceived
as demanded relations among human beings, which stimulate claim-
ants to appeal to processes of decision and invoke the prescription and
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application of authoritative policy. Every phase in the processes of au-
thoritative decision is affected both by the past distribution of values
and by the perspectives (demands, identifications, and expectations)
of participants about future distribution. The outcomes of processes
of authoritative decision, in turn, not only directly affect the future
distribution of values among the claimants and others but, in total
impact and in the long run, determine and secure a community's pub-
lic order.
For comprehensive and precise description of the social process
context of decision, any categorizations of values and institutional
practices which can be given detailed operational indices in terms of
specific, empirical relations between human beings can be made to
serve the purposes of policy-oriented inquiry. The most general con-
ceptualization we recommend is in terms of eight value-institution
categories made familiar by contemporary social science:
Power: government, law, politics.
Wealth: production, distribution, consumption.
Respect: social class and caste.
Well-being: health, safety, comfort arrangements.
Affection: family, friendship circles, loyalty.
Skill: artistic, vocational, professional training and ac-
tivity.
Rectitude: churches and related articulators and appliers
of standards of responsible conduct.
Enlightenment: mass media, research.
When these or equivalent value-institutional categories are em-
ployed, in appropriately detailed phase analysis, to describe the events
in social process which precipitate claims to authoritative decision, the
claims which participants make about such precipitating events and
relevant policies in their appeals to decision, and the choices which the
established decision-makers actually make in their prescriptions and
applications of policy, then effective comparisons can be made through
time within single communities, and across the boundaries of commu-
nities, for study of the factors that affect decision and of the public or-
der consequences of decision.
5. The Relation of Law to Its Larger Community Context
A completely contextual, configurative theory about law will recog-
nize that today mankind interacts on a global, and even earth-space
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scale. In the sense of interdetermination with respect to all values, the
whole of mankind presently constitutes a single community, however
primitive. One component of this largest community is a process of
effective power in the sense that decisions are in fact taken and en-
forced, by severe deprivations and high indulgences, which are inclu-
sive in their research and effects. Similarly, within this comprehensive
process of effective power, may be observed an integral, transnational
process of authoritative decision in the sense of a continuous flow of
decisions made from perspectives of authority-that is, made by the
people who are expected to make them, in accordance with commu-
nity expectations about how they should be made, in established struc-
tures, and by authorized procedures. This transnational process of au-
thoritative decision, like its embracing transnational social processes,
is maintained at many different community levels and in many differ-
ent interpenetrating patterns of perspectives and operations, in affect-
ing and being affected by, the value processes in all the component
communities of the larger earth-space community. A global public or-
der, thus, affects the internal public order of its many constituent com-
munities and the internal public order of each constituent community,
in turn, affects the global public order.
Unintimidated by monists who posit an as yet non-existent univer-
sality, or dualists who insist upon an impossible separation of national
and transnational law, or neo-realists who suggest that international law
is a form of fraudulent moralizing of little consequence, proponents of a
relevant theory about law will seek an accurate empirical account of
the reciprocal impact or interaction, in the distribution of inclusive
and exclusive decisions and in consequences for values, of the inter-
penetrating processes of national and transnational authority. Inquiry
will be directed not toward hierarchies of normative-ambiguous rules
but toward the interdeterminations of communities and value pro-
cesses of many differing degrees of geographic reach, including the
contemporary emerging regional communities. Inclusive and exclusive
decisions will be conceived not as dichotomous absolutes but as ex-
pressing a continuum in degrees of shared participation in the making
of decisions, with reference not only to the number of participants
but to degrees of sharing in all detailed phases, including clarification
of common interests, access to arenas, control over base values, man-
agement of strategies, and determination of outcomes. All important
arenas, whether external or internal to particular communities under
observation, will be brought within inquiry. Special consideration will
be given to appraising, in terms of their consequences for preferred
1971]
HeinOnline -- 44 S. Cal. L. Rev. 389 1970-71
390 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:362
values, the contentions of rival systems of public order, of incompati-
ble value orientation, aspiring toward completion on a global or earth-
space scale 4 0
C. THE PEaRORMANCE OF INTELLECTUAL TASKS
The intellectual tasks for whose performance provision must be made
in a relevant jurisprudence have already been indicated to extend, be-
yond traditional exercises in derivational logic and even the activities
designated by more restrictive conceptions of "science," to a whole
complex of interrelated activities, indispensable both to effective in-
quiry and to rational choice in decision. The tasks we recommend in-
clude the clarification of goals, the description of past trends in deci-
sion, the analysis of conditions affecting decision, the projection of
future trends in decision, and the invention and evaluation of policy
alternatives. It is believed that this itemization is comprehensive in
that it embraces all the necessary tasks, and economic in that it ex-
cludes or deemphasizes wasteful or unnecessary tasks, such as deriva-
tional exercises with syntactic or transempirical or other ill-defined
premises. Similarly, it is designed to avoid the confusion and ineffi-
ciency inherent in the normative-ambiguity of conventional legal con-
cepts which purport in one undifferentiated stroke simultaneously to
serve all relevant tasks.
By this emphasis upon the deliberate, systematic, and differenti-
ated performance of each of a comprehensive set of intellectual tasks,
it is not our suggestion that these different tasks can be economically
performed in some set order or in complete isolation from each other.
It is rather our recommendation that all tasks be employed configura-
tively, in relation to specified problems in context. The rational em-
ployment of any particular task requires both the disciplined location
of specific problems in their larger context and the systematic testing
of the formulations and findings achieved in the performance of that
particular task against the formulations and findings achieved by the
other tasks with respect to every significant feature of the context.
The performance of all tasks must, thus, relate to the same events and
in measure go forward concurrently, but with clear discrimination in
purpose of observation and particular skill employed.
It remains briefly to indicate what is involved in each of the rec-
ommended tasks.
40. These recommendations are developed in detail in McDougal, Lasswell and
Reisman, Theories about International Law: Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence,
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1. The Clarification of Community Policies
The most relevant clarification will explicitly and deliberately seek
the detailed specification of postulated goals, whatever the level of ab-
straction of their initial formulation, in terms which make clear empir-
ical reference to preferred events in social process. To the degree
that economy permits, every choice in alternatives recommended will
be related to its larger community context and to all important com-
munity interests which may be affected. The time dimensions of clari-
fication will be made explicit by distinguishing immediate or short-
term, middle-range, and long-range objectives. The most secure
clarification will build upon the concurrent and systematic perfor-
mance of all the other relevant intellectual tasks and employ the
knowledge so acquired about past trends in decision, past conditioning
factors, future probabilities, and possible alternative solutions.
2. The Description of Past Trends in Decision
The most relevant description of past trends in decision will be, not
anecdoctal in terms of isolated tidbits of doctrine and practice, but
rather systematic in terms of degrees of approximation to clarified pol-
icies for constitutive process and public order. For the more effective
comparison of decisions and their consequences both through time
and across community boundaries, the events which precipitate re-
course to authoritative decision, the detailed claims which participants
made to such decision, the factors which appear to condition decision,
and the immediate and longer-term consequences of decision for the
participants and others will all be categorized "factually" in terms of
value-institution processes, including all the different detailed phases
of such processes. In supplement of the conventional summaries of
complementary rules and concepts, comprehensive maps in value-
institutional terms will be designed for both constitutive process and
other protected features of public order, and the flow of decision will
be observed in relation to specific, detailed types of claims. Procedures
will be devised for relating specific types of claims to their total con-
text and for appraising the responses by authoritative decision-makers
to such claims in terms of their conformity to clarified policies.
3. The Analysis of Factors Affecting Decision
In policy-relevant performance of the scientific task, inquiry will be
made for the interplay of the multiple factors affecting decision, and
overwhelming importance will not be ascribed to any one factor or
category of factors, such as those relating to wealth or to "taught tra-
dition" or the rectitude perspectives. Comprehensive theories about
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the factors affecting decision will be formulated and tested by the ap-
propriate procedures of contemporary science. Formulations will be
inspired by the "maximization postulate" that all responses are,
within the limits of capabilities, a function of net value expectation
and emphasis will be placed upon both predispositional and environ-
mental variables. The significance of factors deriving from culture,
class, interest, personality and previous exposure to crisis will be ex-
plicitly examined. Rigor will be sought in theoretical models, but not
by an over-emphasis upon the importance of mathematical measure-
ment or experiment. Many different vantage points and both extensive
and intensive procedures will be employed in data gathering and pro-
cessing.
4. The Projection of Future Trends
In a policy-relevant jurisprudence, expectations about the future will
be made as conscious, explicit, comprehensive, and realistic as possi-
ble. Developmental constructs, embodying varying alternative antici-
pations of the future, will be deliberately formulated and tested in the
light of all available information. The simple linear or chronological
extrapolations made in conventional legal theory will be subjected to
the discipline of knowledge about conditioning factors and past
changes in the composition of trends.
5. The Invention and Evaluation of Policy Alternatives
In a policy-relevant jurisprudence, creativity will be encouraged by
demand for the deliberate invention and assessment of new alterna-
tives in policy, institutional structures, and procedures. Every phase
of decision process, whether of constitutive process or relating to pub-
lic order, and every facet of conditioning context, will be examined
for opportunities in innovation which may influence decision toward
greater conformity with clarified goals. Assessment of particular alter-
natives will be made in terms of gains and losses with respect to all
clarified goals and disciplined by the knowledge acquired of trends,
conditioning factors, and future probabilities. All the other intellec-
tual tasks will be synthesized and brought to bear upon search for in-
tegrative solutions characterized by maximum gains and minimum
losses. Special procedures for encouraging creativity will be employed,
including expansions and contractions of the focus of attention, alter-
nation of periods of intensive concentration and inattention, free as-
sociation, and experiment with random combinations.
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D. Tim EXPLICIT POSTULATION OF BASIC PUBLIC ORDER GoALs
A relevant jurisprudence will recognize that policy choices are inerad-
icable components of any process of authoritative decision and that
there are today rival systems of public order aspiring toward comple-
tion both internally within states and on a global scale. For everyone
concerned with inquiry about law, one insistent question must be:
what basic policy goals is he, as a responsible citizen of the larger com-
munity of mankind and of various lesser component communities,
willing to recommend to other similarly responsible citizens as the pri-
mary postulates of public order, infusing and transcending all particu-
lar communities?
We emphasize the postulation and clarification of public order
goals in contradistinction to their derivation. Infinitely regressive logi-
cal derivations from premises of transempirical or highly ambiguous
inference contribute litttle to the detailed specification of values, in
the sense of demanded relations between human beings, which is re-
quired for rational decision. Peoples subscribing to very different
styles in derivation have long demonstrated that they can cooperate
for promotion of the values of human dignity, irrespective of the
faiths or creeds which they employ for justification. Expressions of
preference among different derivations can only divide potential co-
workers, without contributing to creativity.
The comprehensive set of goal values which, because of many
heritages, we recommend for clarification and implementation are, as
already suggested, those which are today commonly characterized as
the basic values of human dignity, or of a free society. These are the
values bequeathed to us by all the great democratic movements of
mankind and being very more insistently expressed in the rising com-
mon demands and expectations of peoples everywhere. As demanded
in the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the proposed covenants on human rights, regional agreements
and programs, national constitutions, political party platforms, and
other official and unofficial pronouncements, these values are of course
formulated at many different levels of abstraction and in many differ-
ent cultural and institutional modalities. The basic thrust of all for-
mulations is, however, toward the greatest production and widest pos-
sible distribution of all important values, and the appropriate task for
both scholarly observers and authoritative decision-makers, who accept
and seek to implement these rising common demands, is that of effec-
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tively performing all the various intellectual tasks outlined above for
the better relation of broad general preferences for shared power,
shared respect, shared enlightenment, and so on to all the specific
choices which must be made in different specific contexts in the pre-
scription and application of law.
The basic goal values postulated for preferred public order can-
not of course be representative only of the exclusive, parochial values
of some particular segment of the larger community of mankind, but
such values can admit a very great diversity in the institutional prac-
tices by which they are sought and secured. In different particular
communities and cultures very different institutional practices may
contribute equally to overriding goals for the increased production
and sharing of values. When overriding goals are accepted, experi-
ment and creativity may be encouraged by the honoring of a wide
range of functional equivalents in the institutional practices by which
values are sought.
It will be noted that the postulation of basic goal values we rec-
ommend differs from a mere exercise in faith. We do not expect to
acquire new knowledge by postulation alone. It is only by the system.
atic and disciplined exercise of the various relevant intellectual skills
that new knowledge can be acquired.
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